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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXI January, 1933 Number 2
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS ANNOTATED
WITH KENTUCKY DECISIONS*
CONDUCT VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM
OFFENSIVE BODILY TOUCHINGS (BATTERY)
BY ANDREW J. RUSSELL**
Section 12. Causing an offensive touching of another
person, although involving no bodily harm, unless privileged,
subjects the one causing it to a liability to the other, if
(a) it is not consented to by the other, and
(b) it is directly or indirectly caused by
(i) an act done with the intention of bringing about a
harmful or offensive touchnng or an apprehension thereof to
the other or a third person, or
* This is the first installment of the Kentucky Annotations to the
Restatement of the Law of Torts. The restatement work is being
done by the American Law Institute. The annotation work is being
done by the authority of and in cooperation with the Kentucky State
Bar Association and the American Law Institute. It is being pre-
pared on this and other subjects by the members of the faculties of
the University of Louisville Law School and the University of Ken-
tucky Law College. Other installments will appear in the Kentucky
Law Journal. However Sections 1 to 11 inclusive will not appear in
the Kentucky Law Journal. The author is starting with Section 12
because the material in the first eleven sections may easily and
logically be covered in Sections 12 to 48 inclusive. This omission is
made for the purpose of economizing space in the Law Journal. When
the book is complete in a bound volume these first eleven sections
will be included just as they appear in the Restatement. The author
of this article is indebted to Mr. Joe R. Gathright, an honor student
;n the University of Louisville Law School, for valuable assistance.
** Andrew J. Russell, A. B., Berea College, 1926; LL. B., Yale
University, 1928; Associated with Dean Robert M. Hutchins and Mr.
Donald Slessinger in the preparation of articles on the law of Evi-
dence and Psychology; Professor of Law, School of Law, University
of Louisville, since 1929.
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(ii) a breach of a duty to protect the other from such a
touclng or apprehension.
Annotation
Section 10 of the Kentucky Statutes provides that "no right of
action for personal injury or injury to real or personal estate shall
cease or die with the person injuring or injured, except actions for
assault, slander, criminal conversation, etc." An accidental shooting
constitutes an assault and battery under this statute and does not
survive the one charged with the offense. Anderson v. Arnold's Exr.
(1881), 79 Ky. 370, 2 Ky L. R. 364.
A death caused by negligently running over one with a wagon is
not an assault and battery and does not survive. "Intention to do harm
is of the essence of assault." Perkins v. Stein (1893), 94 Ky. 433, 22
S. W 649, 15 Ky. L. R. 203, 20 L. R. A. 861.
Note also Section 241 of the Constitution of Kentucky providing
for a recovery for a death caused by negligence. The Kentucky Stat-
utes provide under what circumstances and by whom recovery may be
had.
See K. S. 4, allowing a widow and minor children, or either, or
both of them, to recover for the death of a person caused by the care-
less, wanton, or malicious use of fire arms or weapons.
The terms "assault and battery" are used rather loosely in Ken-
tucky. "Assault" is sometimes used to include both assault and battery.
It is interesting to note that only "assault" is used in K. S. Sec. 10.
The plaintiff's son in order to oust the defendant's wife from the
house for not paying rent, removed the furniture and the cap from the
stove and poured water on the fire to "smoke her out" The woman
was in bed sick. The Court of Appeals sustained an instruction that
"if the jury should believe that the assault was willful and malicious it
might in its discretion award punitive damages." Wood v. Young
(1899), 20 Ky L. R. 1931, 50 S. W 541.
Section 13. A touching is offensive if
(a) it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity, or
(b) although not causing bodily harm, it violates the
physical structure of the other's body, or
(c) it creates a reasonable apprehension that it will cause
bodily harm.
(a) A flicks a glove in B's face. This is an offensive
touching of B.
(b) A, while walking m a densely crowded street, de-
liberately but unavoidably pushes against B. This is not an
offensive touching of B.
(c) A, a surgeon, makes a trivial and harmless scratch
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upon B's body in the course of an operation to which B has
not consented. This is an offensive touching of B.
(d) A, who is suffering from a contagious skin disease,
touches B's hands, thus putting B in reasonable apprehension
of contagion. This is an offensive touching of B.
Annotation
"A battery is an actual infliction of violence on the person. The
degree of the violence is not regarded in the law. Thus any touching
of the person in an angry, revengeful, rude or insolent manner;
spitting upon the person; jostling him out of the way; pushing another
against him; throwing a squib or any missile or water upon him,
striking the horse he is riding, whereby he is thrown; taking hold of
his clothes in angry or insolent manner to detain him-is a battery.
So, striking the skirt of his coat or the cane in his hand is a battery;
for anything attached to the person partakes of its inviolability"
Perkins v. Stein (1893), 94 Ky. 433, 15 Ky. L. R. 203, 22 S. W 649.
No decision has held that one is liable to another if he inflicts
upon the other a touching which he knows will be offensive to the
other's abnormally acute sense of personal dignity. This Section
states the effect of the decided cases, and is not intended to express
any opinion as to the advisability or inadvisability of recognizing
liability in such case, as to which see Treatise.
Section 14. An offensive touching intentionally inflicted
upon another without his consent creates liability although the
other did not at the time know that it was being inflicted upon
him.
(a) A, a surgeon, while B is under anesthesia, makes an
examination of her person to which she has not given her
consent. A is liable to B.
(b) A kisses B while B is asleep but does not waken or
injure her. A is liable to B.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 15. The touching may be by any part of the
actor's body, by his clothing, by anything held by or attached
to him, or by anything set in motion and directed by kmu
against the other.
(a) A touches B with a cane, a stick, or glove, or throws
even a drop of water upon him. A is liable to B if the touch-
ing is intended to be and is offensive.
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Annotation
No local authorities. See the annotation to Section 13 for illustra-
tions of a battery and annotation to Section 12 on the question of
Intention.
Section 16. (1) Clothing worn by or anything so closely
attached to one as to be reasonably regarded as a part of one's
personality, partakes of its inviolability and a touching thereof
is a touching of one's person.
(a) A takes hold of the lapel of B's oat to detain him
against his will, or strikes a cigar from B's mouth or a cane
from B's hand. This is an offensive touching of B's person.
(2) If the thing, though attached to the other's person,
is not so closely attached to it as to be reasonably regarded as
part of his personality, a touching of it is not a touching of his
person, unless the touching is intended to be and is offensive
to the other's personality and is not directed against the thing
as a thing.
(b) A is leading a dog owned by himself or another on a
leash. The dog snaps at B's heels and B kicks the dog. Tins
is not a touching of A's person.
(c) A, being angry at B and desiring to insult him, kicks
B's dog which he is leading on a leash. This is a touching of
B's person.
Annotation
The game warden forcibly took a pair of saddle bags which the
plaintiff was holding in his hands under a claim of right to search.
The court held that defendant was privileged because "the uncontra-
dicted proof shows that no assault was committed and that the ease
is one of trespass only" Manning v. Roberts (1918), 179 Ky. 550,
200 S. W 937.
Section 17. An offensive touching intentionally inflicted
on another's person without his consent creates liability al-
though it causes no bodily harm to him.
Comment
An offensive touching is actionable even if it benefits the
physical condition of the other's body Bodily harm is defined
in Section 3.
(a) A intentionally spits in B's face. A is liable to B.
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though his act acuses B no physical pain and does no sub-
stantial harm to his body or clothing.
(b) A, a surgeon, having performed an operation on B's
nose to which B 'has consented, proeeds to remove a polypus
which B has refused to permit him to remove. The operation
causes no pamn, involves no expense for its after treatment and
is successful and beneficial. A is liable to B.
Annotation
The Kentucky Courts hold in accordance with this view. The de-
fendant came to the home of a young married woman and took undue
liberties with her person by rubbing her face and squeezing her
shoulders and breast. The defendant was held liable. Hatchett v.
Blacketer (1915), 162 Ky. 266; 172 S. W 533.
Section 18. The intentional infliction of an offensive
touching, if privileged, creates no liability
Section 19. The infliction of an offensive touching upon
another does not subject one causing it to a liability if the
other consents thereto.
Section 20. If an act is done with the intention stated in
Section 22 (1) and causes an offensive touching of another,
the actor is liable whether the offensive touchnng results direct-
ly or indirectly from the act.
(a) A daubs with filth a towel which he expects B to use
in wiping 'his face, for the purpose of having B smear his face
with it. B does so. A is liable to B for the injury which he
has done to B's personal dignity
(b) A pulls from under B a chair upon which A knows
B is about to sit. B falls to the floor but sustains no bodily
harm. A is liable to B.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 21. The touching, unless it results from a breach
of duty to protect another therefrom, must be caused by an
act of the person whose liability is in question.
(a) A takes hold of B's hand and with it strikes C or
pushes B against C doing no bodily harm. A, and not B, is
liable to C.
Annotation
This section is supported by the Kentucky authorities. The de-
fendant's conductor shoved and kicked plaintiff's father against her
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while committing assault and battery on the father. The plaintiff
suffered bodily harm. C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Robmet (1913), 151 Ky. 778,
152 S. W 976, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 433.
A and B would both be liable in C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Robinet, supra,
if it could be shown that there was a conspiracy between them or that
they are acting in concert. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. 'Flora
(1930), 237 Ky. 191, 35 S. W. (2) 275.
In an action by the plaintiff against several defendants for assault
and battery, evidence of a previous affray between some of the parties
is admissible to show a combination of the defendants to beat the
plaintiff. Sodusky v. McGee (1831), 28 Ky. (5 J. J. Marsh.) 621.
There is joint liability where one procures the beating of another.
The beating must have been procurred and not merely encouraged.
It is error to instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff if it finds that
the defendant encouraged the beating. The court should have used
"procured' instead of "encouraged." Bird et al. v. Lynn (1850), 49
Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 422.
Section 22. (1) To create liability an act winch causes
an offensive touching, involving no bodily -harm, must be done
with the intention of bringing about either a harmful or offen-
sive touching or an apprehension thereof.
Comment
In order that an offensive touching may be actionable it is
not necessary that the actor intends to inflict an offensive touch-
ing. It is enough that he intends to inflict either an offensive or
a harmful touching or to bring about an apprehension thereof.
(a) A alms a blow at B with a heavy stick. A bystander
cheeks hns arm so that the stick merely grazes B's arm, doing it
no harm. A is liable to B.
(b) A, intending merely to frighten B, throws a bucket-
ful of water towards him. The water unexpectedly splashes in
B's face. This is -an actionable touching of B's person.
(2) Causing a touching which is offensive but involves no
bodily harm does not create liability unless done with the in-
tention stated in Subsection (1).
(c) A, without any intention of wetting anyone, throws
water out of his window at night. He knows that B is walk-
ing down the street towards his house and that there is a
strong probability, though, not a certainty, that the water will
wet B. A is not liable to B if a small quantity of water
splashes in his face but does him no bodily harm.
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(d) A throws dirty water from his window at B who is
walking on a street below A few drops fall on B's hand but
do him no bodily harm. A is liable to B.
(e) A drives an automobile through a city street. Being
engrossed in conversation, he does not see B, a pedestrian,
who, m seeing A's car approaching, steps aside. The mud-
guard brushes B's coat and the wheels splash mud in B's face.
A is not liable to B.
(f) A while driving an automobile sees B standing on the
sidewalk. He drives his car through a muddy puddle for the
purpose of splashing B. A few drops of muddy water splash
on B's hand but neither do her bodily harm nor injure her
clothing. A is liable to B.
(g) A drives a motor car recklessly through a crowded
street at a speed prohibited by ordinance. The pedestrians
upon the street, seeing him approach, leap out of the way,
but the mudguard brushes the coat of B, one of the pedestrians,
and the wheel splashes mud in the face of C, another
pedestrian. A is not liable to B or C.
Annotation
The Kentucky decisions are in accord with this section. One can
recover punitive damages only when the striking was wilful and
malicious. Hollis v. Gorham (1902), 23 Ky. L. R. 2185, 66 S. W 823.
In a battery case the court held that any evidence which might
tend to show malice or improper motive on the part of the defendant
is admissible. Sodusky v. McGee (1830), 27 Ky. (4 J. J. Marsh.) 267.
An injury inflicted by the negligence of one is not an assault and
battery because of the absence of an intention to do harm. Perkins
v. Stein (1893), 94 Ky. 433, 15 Ky. L. R. 203, 22 S. W 649, 20 L. R. A.
861.
The case of negligence is to be distinguished from Anderson v.
Arnold's Exr.'s. (1881), 79 Ky. 370, 2 Ky. L. R. 364, where the plain-
tiff's intestate was accidentally shot and killed by the defendant who
was shooting at another person, on the ground that the shooting was
a wilful act.
Section 23. An act is done with the intention of inflict-
iug upon another a harmful or offensive touching or putting
another in apprehension thereof if it is done for the purpose
of bringing about such a touching or apprehension or with
knowledge that such a touching or apprehension will result
from the act.
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Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 24. An act winch is intended to affect a third
person in the manner stated in Section 23 but which causes
an offensive touching to another creates liability to the other
as fully as if intended to so affect him.
(a) A throws a bucketful of water over B for the pur-
pose of wetting him. C is known by A to be standing arm m
arm with B. A neither knows nor has reason to expect that
D is in the vicinity of B. Just as A throws the water, D sud-
denly comes up behind B. The water wets B, C and D. A
intends to wet B since he throws the water with- the purpose
of wetting B. He intends to wet 0, since, although he has no
desire to wet C, he knows that water thrown at B will wet C.
*While A does not intend to wet D, A is liable to D because
D is wet by an act intended to wet B and C.
Annotatson
The defendant in making an attack on plaintiff's husband ran
against plaintiff. The defendant was held liable to the plaintiff.
McGee v. Vanover (1912), 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W 742, Ann. Cases
1913E, 500.
The defendant shot and killed the plaintiff's slave while the slave
was stealing the defendant's chickens. The defendant thought that
he was using small shot that would not kill but only wound. By mis-
take the defendant used large shot, not intended, and killed the slave.
The lower court instructed the jury to find for the plaintiff if the
defendant shot without speaking to the slave. The upper court held
that this was error. The instructions should have been qualified so
that if the defendant intended only to wound the slave and reasonably
thought that the shot would only have that result, and if it was at
night when the slave could not be apprehended judgment should be
for the defendant. McClelland v. Kay (1S53), 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 84.
Section 25. If an act, winch causes an offensive touching
of another is done with the intention stated in Section 22 (1)
it creates liability although it is not inspired by personal
hostility or desire to offend.
(a) A and B are in the habit of playing rough practical
jokes on one another. A mistakes C and B and pulls his hat
down over his eyes. A is liable to C.
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Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 26. (1) An offensive touching caused by the
breach of a duty to protect another therefrom creates the lia-
bility stated in Section 12.
Annotation
As to the duty of a husband to protect another from the assaults
of his wife see Faulkner v. Davis (1897), 18 Ky L. R. 1004, 38 S. W
1049; Phillips v. Phillips (1847), 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 268; Bobich v.
Dackow (1929), 229 Ky. 830, 18 S. W (2nd) 280; Beavers v. Bowen
(1904), 26 Ky. L. R. 291, 80 S. W. 1165.
(2) There is no general duty to protect another from
offensive. touchings inflicted by a third party
(a) A knows that B is about to throw a glass of wine in
C's face. A could, without any inconvenience to himself, pre-
vent B from carrying out his purpose but deliberately refrains
from so doing or upon B's request refuses to do so. B, and
not A, is liable to C.
Annotation-
The relationship between a defendant and one may be such as to
impose a duty on a defendant to stop an attack on a third party by a
companion. See a very unusual case in Gillon v. Wilson (1826), 19
Ky. (3 T. B. Mon.) 216.
CONDUCT VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM
APPREHENSION OF A HARMFUL OR OFFEN-
SIVE BODILY TOUCHING (ASSAULT)
Section 27. Causing to another an apprehension of an
innmediate and harmful or offensive touching, unless privileged,
subjects the one causing it to a liability to the other"
(a) if it is not consented to by the other, and
(b) it is directly or indirectly caused by
(i) an act, other than the mere speaking of words, in-
tended to bring about such a touching or an apprehension
thereof to the other or a third person, or
(ii) a breach of duty to protect the other from such
apprehension.
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Annotatiorn
There are not many cases in Kentucky on assault. Most of them
jnclude a battery.
"An assault is an unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by
Iforce, or it is force unlawfully directed, toward the person of another
under such circumstances as to create a well founded fear of im-
mediate peril." Justice v. Phillips (1885), 7 Ky. L. R. 439, 13 Ky. Op.
836.
Comment
A harmful touching is one which causes bodily harm as
defined in Section 3. An offensive touching is such a touch-
ing as is defined in Section 13.
Annotation
Flourishing a cocked pistol about in an angry manner and point-
Ing it at one constituted an assault. Although the defendant had no
ill will against the plaintiff. Justice v. Phillips (1885), 7 Ky. L. R.
439; 13 Ky Op. 836.
Section 29. An attempt to bring about a harmful or offen-
sive touching or an apprehension thereof does not create the
liability stated in Section 27, if the attempt is abandoned or
frustrated before the other knows of it.
(a) A, standing behind B, points a pistol at him. C over-
powers A before he can shoot. B, hearing the noise, turns
around and for the first time realizes the peril in which he has
been. A is not liable to B.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 30. (1) There is no liability if the other although
knowing of the act and realizing its purpose does not believe
that it actually threatens a touching.
(2) There is a liability as stated in Section 27, although
the other believes that the touching may be prevented by self-
defensive measures, flight or intervening force.
(a) A alms a blow at B. B is confident that he can escape
the'blow by retreat or by dodging it and succeeds in doing so.
A is liable to B.
(b) A, when within a few feet of B, starts towards him
threatening to hit him. A number of B's friends are standing
A. L. I. RESTATEMIENT OF LAW OF TORTS
about. B believes that his friends will interfere and prevent
A from striking hin. They do so. A is liable to B.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 31. Except as stated in Section 48, the apprehen-
sion must be of a touching inflicted by the one who causes the
apprehension.
(a) A, for the purpose of frightening B, says to hin,
"Hide1 0 is pointing a pistol at you." B is frightened but
suffers no bodily harm. A is not liable to B whether his state-
ment to B is true or false.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 32. The other must be put in apprehension of a
touching of his own person.
(a) A points a pistol at the husband of B with the inten-
tion of causing B to apprehend an immediate touching of her
husband. A is not liable to B.
Annotation
The plaintiff cannot recover for fright caused by a battery on
her husband. There was no evidence of any intention to create fear
in her, nor was she put in fear of harm to herself. McGee v. Vanover
(1912), 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W 742, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 500.
The defendant in a drunken condition made an atrocious attack
on McConnell 3ust outside the plaintiff's room. The plaintiff hearing
the noise and threats was frightened and suffered a miscarriage. The
defendant neither knew or had reason to know that the plaintiff was
an the room. The court held that the defendant was not liable to the
plaintiff. Reed v. Ford (1908), 129 Ky. 471, 112 S. W 600.
Shields went into his house after a combat with defendant. His
wife who had recently given birth to a child seeing blood on his hand
became nervous and ill. Milk stopped flowing which resulted in under
nourishment of the child and retarding its growth. The court refused
consideration of these facts as items of recovery. Shields Admr. v.
Rowland (1912), 151 Ky. 136, 151 S. W 408.
Section 33. It is not necessary that an act, which puts
another in apprehension of an immediate and harmful or offen-
sive touching, be such as would put a person of ordinary cour-
age in apprehension of a touching.
K. L. J.-2
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Annotation.
The plaintiff must reasonably believe that she is about to be
struck. Morgan v. O'Damel (1899), 21 Ky. L. R. 1044, 53 S. W 1040.
Section 34. It is not necessary that the other believe that
the actor intends to inflict a touching upon him.
(a) A fires a pistol at the ground near B's feet for the
purpose of making him dance, having obviously no intention
of hitting B. B, fearing that A's markmanship may not be so
good as A himself believes it to be, is put in apprehension that
he may be shot. A is liable to B.
Annotatwhn
No local authorities.
Section 35. (1) The apprehension must be of an im-
mediate touching.
Comment
The act must be apparently efficient to carry into im-
mediate effect an intention to inflict the touching apprehended
by the other. It is not necessary that one shall be within strik-
ing distance of the other or that a weapon pointed at the other
shall be in a condition for instant discharge. It is enough that
one is so close to striking distance that he can reach the other
or that he can make the weapon ready for discharge -within
a very short interval of time.
(a) A and B-are engaged in an altercation in A's shop.
B refuses to leave A's shop at A's order. A collects his work-
men who muster around B, tucking up their sleeves and aprons
and threatening to break B's neck if he does not leave. A and
his workmen are liable to B.
(b) A threatens to strike B and rushes towards him with
hand or weapon raised. A's purpose is frustrated while he is
still some few feet from effective striking distance. A is liable
to B.
(c) A points an uncocked pistol at B, who knows it is
uncocked. The pistol can be cocked and made ready for effec-
tive use in an instant. A is liable to B.
Annotation .
It is an assault for one to use threatening language and to make
.menacing gestures towards another. Morgan v. O'Daniel (1899), 21
Ky L. R. 1044, 53 S. W 1040.
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The plaintiff ran towards the defendant reaching for him with.
one hand, with the other dropped by his side causing the defendant to
reasonably believe that he had a knife concealed therein. Held to be
an assault. Hixon v. Slocum (1913), 156 Ky. 487, 161 S. W 522, 51
L. R. A. (N. S.) 838.
(2) An act apparently intended as a step to carry out a
purpose to mfict a future touching, but not apparently efficient
to cause an immediate touching, does not create liability
Comment
Such an act is mere preparation. The point at which an
act ceases to be preparation for a future touching and threatens
a touching so immediate as to be actionable is incapable of
statement so exact as to be automatically applicable to the
circumstances of every case which may arise. )"iat is im-
mediate depends upon the circumstances of the particular case
and is a matter for the judgment of the court or jury
(d) A threatens to shoot B and leaves the room with the
express purpose of getting his revolver. A is not liable to B.
(e) A threatens to shoot B, having in his hand a revolver
which both know to be unloaded. He goes to the desk to get
cartridges to load the revolver but before he can put them in
the revolver he is overpowered by bystanders. A is not liable
to B.
Annotation
The court held that there was no assault where the defendant's
son threatened to nail up all the doors if plaintiff did not move from
the house where she had not paid rent. Plaintiff was in bed with flu
and left sooner than she would have, causing her illness. Smith v.
Gowdy (1922), 196 Ky. 281, 244 S. W 678, 29 A. L. R. 1353.
Section 36. One who intentionally puts another in appre-
hension of an immediate and harmful or offensive touching is
liable although he gives the other an option to escape the touch-
ing by obedience to a command given by him.
Comment
It is- immaterial whether the act which the actor com-
mands the other to do or cease doing is or is not an act which
the other is under a legal duty to do or to cease doing. It is also
immaterial whether the other does or does not obey the com-
mand.
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(a) A points a pistol at B and says "Your money or
your life." A is liable to B.
(b) A, standing near B, draws back his hand and
threatens to knock B down unless he retracts certain defama-
tory statements that he has made about A or a member of his
family A is liable to B.
(c) A, standing near B, draws back his hand and threatens
to knock B down if he does not stop talking. A is liable to B.
(d) A owes B a sum of money B points a gun at A,
saying- "If you do not pay me my money, I will have your
life." B is liable to A.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 37. If the act has put another in apprehension of
an immediate and harmful or offensive touching it creates lia-
bility although the actor abandons his purpose or Ins purpose
is frustrated.
(a) A threatens to shoot B and points a pistol at him, but
changes his purpose and lowers it without firing. A is liable
to B.
(b) A points a pistol at B but, before he can shoot, C, a
bystander, strikes the pistol from ns hand. A is liable to B.
(c) A points at B a pistol which he, A, has forgotten to
load. He unsuccessfully attempts to shoot B. A is liable to B.
(d) A points a loaded pistol at B but before he can shoot,
B knocks him down. A is liable to B.
Annotation
No local authorities..
Section 38. The intentional putting of another in appre-
hension of an immediate and harmful or offensive touching, if
privileged, does not create liability
Annotation
Privilege is treated in Section 78 to Section 164 of the Restatement.
Section 39. To create liability the apprehension must be
without the consent of the person put in apprehension.
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Annotation
Consent is treated in Section 66 to Section 77 of the Restatement.
Section 40. If an act is done with the intention stated in
Section 43 (1) and causes to another an apprehension of an
immediate and harmful or offensive touching, the actor is
liable whether the apprehension results directly or indirectly
from the act.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 41. The apprehension, unless it results from a
breach of a duty to protect another therefrom, must be caused
by an act done by the one whose liability is in question.
(a) A takes hold of B's hand and with it strikes at C. C
dodges the blow A and not B is liable to C.
Annotation
No authorities as to a battery committed in a similar way; see
annotation to Section 21.
Section 42. (1) To create the liability stated in Section
27 the apprehension, unless it results from a breach of a duty
to protect another therefrom, must be caused by an act other
than the mere speaking of words.
(a) A utters a threat to shoot B. A does no act to carry
it into effect. A is not liable to B.
Annotation
Accord. "In law mere words cannot justify an assault, though
they can be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages." Doer-
hoefer v. Shewmaker (1906), 123 Ky. 646, 29 Ky. L. R. 1193, 97 S. W 7;
Grau et al. v. Forge et al. (1919), 183 Ky. 521, 209 S. W 369, 3 A. L. R.
642.
Mere words will not constitute an assault. Louisville R. R. Co.
v. Kramer (1928), 226 Ky. 739, 11 S. W (2nd) 930. (Words spoken
were pleaded in defense to an action of assault and battery.)
Reed v. Maley (1903), 115 Ky. 816; 74 S. W. 1079, 25 Ky. L. R. 209,
62 L. R. A. 900. (The defendant solicited the plaintiff to have inter-
course with him.)
L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Simpson (1916), 171 Ky. 138, 188 S. W 297.
(The defendant ordered the plaintiff from his house tor no just cause,
using abusive language)
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See also Hixon v. Slocum (1913), 156 Ky. 487, 161 S. W 522, 51
L. 1R. A. (N. S.) 838; Morgan v. O'Daniel (1899), 21 Ky. L. R. 1044,
53 S. W 1040.
(2) Words accomlpanying or preceding acts, if heard or
known and understood, may be evidence of the other's appre-
hension and of the actor's intention to bring it about.
(b) A half draws his sword from its scabbard and says
to B "If it were not assize tine I would not take such lan-
guage from you." A is not liable to B, although but for his
words his conduct would have been actionable.
(c) A utters a threat to shoot B and puts his hand to his
hip pocket. B believes that A is about to draw a pistol and
carry out his threat. A has no pistol. A is liable to B.
Annotation
The plaintiff was approaching the defendant in a menacing man-
ner using threatening language. The plaintiff's right hand was dropped
by his side. In fact it was in this position because of its crippled
condition. The defendant thought the plaintiff had a knife. There
was an assault. Hixon v. Slocum (1913), 156 Ky 487, 161 S. W. 522,
61 L. R. A. (N. S.) 838.
Section 43. (1) To create liability an act which causes
only an apprehension of an innmediate and harmful or offensive
touching must be done with the intention of bringing about
either a harmful or offensive touching or an apprehension
thereof.
Comment
If an act causes to another an apprehension of an in-
mediate and harmful or offensive touching) it is not essential
to the existence of liability that it is done with the intention
of bringing about such an apprehension or that the actor has
reason to recognize the probability that such an apprehension
may result from his act. It is enough that the act is done
with the intentions of bringing about a 'harmful or offensive
touching.
(a) A throws a stone at B whom he believes to be asleep.
B is in fact awake, sees A throwing the stone and escapes be-
ing hit by dodging it. A is liable to B.
(b) A, during -an altercation, raises a glass of wine to.
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throw it in B's face. Bystanders interfere and prevent him
from throwing it. A is liable to B.
(c) A points a gun, which he believes to be loaded with
blank cartridges, at B and puMh the trigger. The cartridge is
blank ,and B, although, frightened, is not injured. A is liable
to B.
Annotation
No local authorities.
(2) An act which, while causing to another an apprehen-
sion of an immediate and harmful or offensive touching, is not
done with the intention stated in Paragraph (1) and invades
no interest of the other except his interest in freedom fro%
such apprehension, does not create liability, although a reason-
able man, under the circumstances which the actor knows or
has reason to know would recognize a probability that the act
would cause such an apprehension.
Comment
The interest in freedom from apprehension of an im-
mediate and harmful or offensive touching is protected only
against such acts as are done with the intention stated in Sub-
section 1. Therefore, a mere apprehension, however negli-
gently caused, creates no liabilitf Such an apprehension,
directly or indirectly caused by an act done without the in-
tention stated in Subsection 1, is not actionable although a
reasonable man would recognize the act as containing a proba-
bility of causing such an apprehension, and this is so, although
the actor himself recognizes that his act makes such an appre-
hension highly probable. The fact that the actor realizes that
his act creates such a probability may be evidence that he in-
tends to bring about such an apprehension but does not of it-
self make him liable.
There may, however, be a liability for the invasion of
interests, other than the interest in freedom from such an ap-
prehension, although the invasion is caused by an apprehension
unintentionally created. Such a liability may arise if the
interest invaded is protected against merely negligent invasion
and the circumstances which the actor knows or has reason to
know are such that a reasonable man would recognize it as
probable that an apprehension of a harmful or offensive touch-
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ing would materially affect such interest. The principles which'
determine liability for an invasion of the interest in freedom
from bodily harm and of other interests also protected against
negligent conduct by the unintentionally, but negligently,
putting another in 'apprehension of a harmful or offensive
touching, are stated in those divisions of the restatement which
deal with the negligent invasions of the respective interests
concerned.
(d) A drives a car at a very high rate of speed down a
city B steps out from the curb to cross the street and then
sees A's car coming rapidly towards him. He leaps back and
barely escapes. If B suffers no bodily harm as a result of his
fright, A is not liable to him although any reasonable man
would have recognized that driving a car in such a manner
was very likely to cause serious injury to pedestrians.
Annotation
"Intention to do harm Is of the essence of assault." Perkins v.
Stein (1893) 94 Ky. 433, 22 S. W 649, 15 Ky. L. R. 203, 20 L. R. A. SG1.
Section 44. An act is done with the intention of inflicting
upon another a harmful or offensive touching or putting an-
other in apprehension thereof if it is done for the purpose of
bringing about such a touching or apprehension or with knowl-
edge that such a touching or apprehension will result from the
act.
(a) A fires a gun at B. The bullet misses B but B, know-
ing of A's attempt, is put in apprehension of being touched.
A intends to inflict a harmful touching on B and B is put in
apprehension of such a touching. A is liable to B.
(b) A points at B a pistol which A, but not B, knows to
be unloaded. A intends to put B in apprehension of a harm-
ful touching and B is put in such an apprehension. A is liable
to B.
(c) A, intending to kill B, throws a bomb into a room in
which he knows B is in company with C, against whom A has
no hostile purpose. The bomb does not go off but both B and
C are put in apprehension. A, having thrown the bomb for
the purpose of injuring B, intends to inflict a harmful touch-
ing upon him. A, though having no desire to injure C, knows
that if the bomb explodes it must injure C as well as B and,
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therefore, intends to inflict a harmful touching on C. A is
liable to B and C, both of whom A puts m apprehension of a
harmful touching.
Annotatwn
No local authorities.
Section 45. An act intended to affect a third person in
the manner stated in Section 44 but which causes another an
apprehension of an innediate and harmful or offensive touch-
nag, creates liability to the other as fully as if intended so to
affect him.
(a) A and B are trespassing in C's woods. C sees B and
points a gun at him and threatens to shoot him. A at the
moment comes from behind a tree, and, seeing C's gun pointed
at him, is put in apprehension of being shot. C does not intend
to bring about either a touching or apprehension thereof to A,
but since A is put in apprehension of being harmfully touched
by an act intended to inflict such a touching on B, C is liable
to A.
Annotation
No local authorities.
Section 46. To create liability stated an Section 27, it is
not necessary that one has, or believes that he has, the ability
to inflict the touching which his act apparently threatens.
Co~nvment
It is only necessary that the other believes that one has
the ability and that one intends to bring about such belief.
(a) A, kmovng a pistol to be unloaded, points it at B and
threatens to shoot him. B believes the pistol to be loaded.
A is liable to B.
Annotation
The plaintiff needs only to reasonably believe that she is about
to be touched. Morgan v. O'Daniel (1899), 21 Ky. L. R. 1044, 53 S. W
1040.
Section 47. If an act which puts another in apprehension
of an innediate and harmful or offensive touching is done
with the intentions'stated an Section 43 (1) it creates liability,
although it as not inspired by personal hostility or desire to
offend.
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(a) A, as a joke upon B, disguises hinself as a tramp and
accosts B on a lonely road, and, pointing an unloaded pistol
at B says, "Your money or your life." A is liable to B.
Annotation
In an action of assault the lower court instructed the jury that
if the defendant did ntend or attempt to strike the plaintiff, to find
for the plaintiff, but if the defendant did not intend or attempt to
strike the plaintiff and was not in striking distance of her, to find
for the defendant. This instruction was held to be erroneous because
all that is necessary to constitute an assault is that the plaintiff
reasonably believes that she is about to be struck. Morgan v. O'Daniel
(1899), 21 Ky. L. R. 1044, 53 S. W 1040.
The defendants in a group armed with clubs went to the plaintiff's
house to rescue an idiot which was being held by the plaintiff. An
affray ensued. The lower court instructed the jury that "if a man or
men, armed with clubs and other weapons, beset to come into a man's
house in a threatening manner it is an assault in law." The court
held this instruction to ,be erroneous saying "it is of the essence of
an assault, therefore, that the act wich constitutes the assault should
be done with an intention to do some personal injury." Metcalfe v.
Conner (1821), 16 Ky. (4 Littell) 370.
Section 48. (1) An apprehension of an iunediate and
harmful or offensive touching caused by the breach of duty to
protect another therefrom creates the liability stated m Sec-
tion 27.
Annotatwn:
No local authorities.
(2) There is no general duty to protect another from be-
ing put by a third party m apprehension of an immediate and
harmful or offensive touching.
(a) A knows that B is about to aim an empty gun at 0.
A could, without inconvenience, prevent B from doing so or
could inform C that the gun is unloaded. He does neither.
B points the gun, putting C in apprehension. A is not liable
to C.
Annotation
No local authorities.
